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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-IMPLICATIONS OF THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE WHEN
IMPOSING STATE USE-TAX COLLECTION ON OUT-OF-
STATE SELLERS: SETTLED EXPECTATIONS?
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992).
I. FACTS
Quill Corp. is a national mail-order vendor that sells office sup-
plies, stationery, and office equipment.1 Quill Corp. has offices and
warehouses in Illinois, California, and Georgia.2 There are no
Quill Corp. personnel working or residing in North Dakota.3 The
amount of tangible property Quill Corp. has in North Dakota is
either insignificant or nonexistent.4 The methods used by Quill
Corp. to solicit business nationwide include mailing catalogs and
flyers, advertising in national periodicals, and making telephone
calls.5 As a result of these solicitation efforts, Quill Corp. has
annual sales of approximately $200,000,000, of which approxi-
mately $1,000,000 is generated by nearly 3,000 North Dakota
customers.6
North Dakota requires the collection and remittance of a use-
tax7 from "retailer[s]"'  who "maintain a place of business in the
1. Brief for Appellant at 3, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992) (No. 91-
194).
2. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1907 (1992). Quill Corp.'s principal
place of business is in Lincolnshire, Illinois. Brief for Appellant at 3, Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992) (No. 91-194).
3. Quill Corp., 112 S. Ct. at 1907.
4. Id. At trial, "the State argued that because Quill gave its customers an unconditional
90-day guarantee, it retained title to the merchandise during [this time period]." Id. at
1907 n.1. The trial court rejected this argument, holding that title passed to the customer
when Quill Corp. shipped the merchandise. North Dakota v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203,
217 n.13 (N.D. 1991), rev'd 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992). The North Dakota Supreme Court did
not address this issue because it found sufficient nexus without determining whether title
had passed. Id. In addition, Quill Corp.'s customers use a computer software program that
serves as a direct communication link, via computer modem, to Quill Corp. Brief for
Respondent at 5, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992) (No. 91-194). Titles to
the diskettes and program are retained by Quill Corp. Id. The United States Supreme
Court determined that Quill Corp.'s interest in both of these properties did not affect either
the Due Process or Commerce Clause analysis. Quill Corp, 112 S. Ct. at 1907 n.1.
5. Quill Corp., 112 S. Ct. at 1907. The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that these
solicitations constituted approximately 24 tons of solid waste in the state annually. North
Dakota v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d at 218.
6. Quill Corp., 112 S. Ct. at 1907-08.
7. "Use" is defined to mean the "exercise by any person of any right or power over
tangible personal property incident to the ownership or possession of that property, except
that it shall not include processing, or the sale of that property in the regular course of
business." N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-40.2-01(9) (1983 & Supp. 1991). Use-taxes are used by
states to fill the gaps when imposition of a sales tax on goods from out-of-state would be
unconstitutional. PAUL J. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL
TAXATION § 10:1 at 57-58 (1981). A use-tax is generally not levied on goods when a sales tax
has been paid. Id. See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-40.2-11 (1983) (providing that goods
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state"9 and make sales of "tangible personal property"' ° for use in
the state." A "[r]etailer maintaining a place of business in the
state" is defined to include:
[E]very person who engages in regular or systematic solic-
itation of sales of tangible personal property in this state
by the distribution of catalogs, periodicals, advertising fly-
ers, or other advertising, by means of print, radio or tele-
vision media, or by mail, telegraphy, telephone, computer
data base, cable, optic, microwave, or other communica-
tion system for the purpose of effecting retail sales or tan-
gible personal property. 12
Therefore, entities engaging in catalog flyer solicitation have been
subject to this tax despite having no property or personnel in
North Dakota. 3 Because Quill Corp. did not collect and remit this
tax on goods purchased by its North Dakota customers, the State
commenced a lawsuit seeking a judgment declaring Quill Corp. a
subject to a sales tax in another state will not be subject to the use-tax unless the other
state's tax rate is less than the current North Dakota use-tax rate).
8. A "retailer" is defined to include:
[E]very person who engages in regular or systematic solicitation of a consumer
market in this state by the distribution of catalogs, periodicals, advertising flyers,
or other advertising, or by means of print, radio or television media, by mail,
telegraphy, telephone, computer data base, cable, optic, microwave or other
communication system.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-40.2-01(6) (1983 & Supp. 1991). State regulations define "[r]egular
or systematic solicitation" to mean three or more advertisements within a 12-month period.
N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 81-04.1-01-03.1 (1988). Quill Corp.'s methods of solicitation in North
Dakota include mailing catalogs and flyers, and making telephone calls to its active North
Dakota customers. Brief for Respondent at 4, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904
(No. 91-194).
9. See infra note 12 and accompanying text for the statutory definition of a "retailer
maintaining a place of business in the state."
10. "Tangible personal property" is defined as:
a. Tangible goods, including the furnishing of bingo cards, wares, and
merchandise, and gas, when furnished or delivered to consumers or users
within the state.
b. The leasing or renting of tangible personal property, the sale, storage, use, or
consumption of which has not been previously subjected to a retail sales or
use tax in this state.
c. The purchase of magazines or other periodicals. Provided, the words
"magazines and other periodicals" as used in this subdivision do not include
newspapers nor magazines or periodicals that are furnished free by a
nonprofit corporation or organization to its members or because of payment
by its members of membership fee or dues.
d. The severance of sand or gravel from the soil.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-40.2-01(8) (Supp. 1991).
11. N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-40.2-07(1) (1983 & Supp. 1991). North Dakota's current
use-tax rate is "five percent of the fair market value of the property at the time it was
brought into [the] state." N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-40.2-02.1(1) (Supp. 1991).
12. N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-40.2-01(7) (Supp. 1991).
13. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1908 (1992).
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"retailer maintaining a place of business in this state." 4 Quill
Corp. maintained the State was powerless in requiring it to collect
and remit a use-tax for its sales to North Dakota customers because
it had no physical presence in North Dakota."
The trial court found that Quill Corp.'s nexus or connections
with North Dakota were insufficient to impose the use-tax upon
Quill Corp.16 Because of the lack of sufficient nexus, the trial court
declared that the North Dakota statutes defining "retailer" and
"retailer maintaining a place of business in the state" were uncon-
stitutional as applied to Quill Corp.17 The North Dakota Supreme
Court reversed the trial court, holding that there was constitution-
ally sufficient nexus between North Dakota and Quill Corp. to
impose the use-tax requirements.'
The issue presented to the United States Supreme Court was
whether Quill Corp. had sufficient nexus with North Dakota to
comport with the requirements of the Due Process and Com-
merce Clauses regarding state taxation of out-of-state retailers.' 9
The United States Supreme Court held that there was adequate
nexus with North Dakota under the Due Process Clause to sustain
the imposition of North Dakota's use-tax statute against Quill
Corp.20 However, the Court held that there was insufficient nexus
to sustain the statute against Quill Corp. under the Commerce
Clause, because Quill Corp. lacked a physical presence in North
Dakota.2'
II. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE DUE PROCESS AND
COMMERCE CLAUSES
The Due Process and Commerce Clauses are closely related,22
and many courts consider the clauses concurrently when resolving
the constitutionality of state taxation statutes.23 Despite this close
14. North Dakota v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 205 (N.D. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct.
1904 (1992).
15. Quill Corp., 112 S. Ct. at 1908.
16. Id.
17. North Dakota v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 204 (N.D. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct.
1904 (1992).
18. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1908, 1909 (1992).
19. Id. at 1907.
20. Id. at 1911.
21. Id. at 1916.
22. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967).
23. HARTMAN, supra note 7, at 12. See Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury,
111 S. Ct. 818, 828 (1991) (stating that the four-part test for the Commerce Clause
encompasses the due process requirements as well); National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 756
(stating that the principles that are used in the Due Process Clause analysis are applicable to
the Commerce Clause analysis).
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relationship, the clauses impose separate and "distinct limits on
the taxing powers of the States."'2 4  The Due Process Clause
focuses on the individual and the fundamental fairness of the gov-
ernmental activity upon the individual.25  In contrast, the Com-
merce Clause focuses on "the effects of state regulation on the
national economy. '26 Moreover, Congress may authorize states to
regulate or impose burdens on interstate commerce; 27 however, it
has no power to authorize due process violations.' Because of
these fundamental differences, the Supreme Court in Quill Corp.
analyzed the Due Process and Commerce Clauses separately.2 9
III. DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
A. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE ON STATE
TAXATION
The Due Process Clause requires that some relationship
between the state and the nonresident exist before the state can
assert authority over that nonresident. 31 With regard to state taxa-
tion, there has been a consistent adherence to the concept that
due process requires some "definite link, some minimum connec-
tion" between a state and the person, property, or transaction to
be taxed.3 1 In National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Reve-
24. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1909 (1992).
25. Id. at 1913 (emphasis added).
26. Id. (emphasis added).
27. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 315 (1945) ("It is no longer
debatable that Congress, in the exercise of the commerce power, may authorize the states,
in specified ways, to regulate interstate commerce or impose burdens upon it."). See also
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 434 (1946) (providing that Congress' power
over commerce is not restricted, and that its plenary power not only allows Congress to
promote commerce but also to prohibit it).
28. Quill Corp., 112 S. Ct. at 1909.
29. Id.
30. Sandra B. McCray, Overturning Bellas Hess: Due Process Considerations, 1985
B.Y.U. L. REV. 265,269 (1985). See also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,471-
72 (1985) ("The Due Process Clause protects an individual's liberty interest in not being
subject to binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful...
'relations.' ").
31. E.g. National Geographic Soc'y v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 561
(1977) (citing Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954)).
From the viewpoint of the ultimate payor, "there is no question of the connection or
link between the State and 'the person... it seeks to tax' [with a use-tax statute]." National
Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 757 n.9 (1967). "The legal
incidence of the use tax is upon the [resident] user or consumer." HARTMAN, supra note 7,
at 57-58. However, the out-of-state entity, which may lack this connection, such as National
Bellas Hess, is generally directly liable for the payment of the tax whether or not it is
collected from the resident consumer. National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 757 n.9 (stating
that "[National Bellas Hess was] made directly liable for the payment of the tax whether
collected or not"). See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-40.2-07(3) (1983 & Supp. 1991)
(providing that a use-tax constitutes a debt owed by the retailer).
The second recognized test to satisfy due process is whether "the income attributed to
the State for tax purposes [is] rationally related to the 'values connected with the taxing
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32 3hue, a case factually similar to Quill Corp.,3 physical presence
was held to be necessary to satisfy due process.34 Prior to National
Bellas Hess, a series of United States Supreme Court decisions indi-
cated that the Court was loosening the physical presence require-
ment in order to satisfy due process.35 However, the National
Bellas Hess Court refused to obliterate the distinction between
those entities having some type of physical presence within the
taxing state and those entities having a connection with the state
only by mail or common carrier.36 Thus, the physical presence
factor continued to be a vital requirement to satisfy due process
demands.
B. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE ON
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Similar to the authority of a state to tax, the early Supreme
Court due process jurisprudence required individuals to be physi-
State."' Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 273 (1978) (citations omitted). The Court
in Quill Corp. concentrated on the "minimum connection" requirement. Quill Corp., 112
S. Ct. at 1910.
32. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
33. See supra notes 1-15 and accompanying text (stating the facts of Quill Corp.);
National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 753-55 (1967). National
Bellas Hess, like Quill Corp., was an out-of-state mail-order company that was subjected to
an Illinois use-tax. National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 753-54. National Bellas Hess
maintained no offices, warehouses, employees, or agents in Illinois. Id. The only contact
National Bellas Hess had with Illinois was via the United States mail or common carrier for
its advertisements and customer order deliveries. Id. at 754. This activity was enough to
render National Bellas Hess a "retailer maintaining a place of business in the State,"
therefore subjecting it to the Illinois use-tax. Id. at 755.
34. Id. at 758. Commentators have suggested that the Commerce Clause, rather than
the Due Process Clause, was the dispositive issue in National Bellas Hess. See Paul J.
Hartman, Collection of the Use Tax on Out-of-State Mail-Order Sales, 39 VAND. L. REV.
993, 1009 (1986) (stating that the Commerce Clause appears to be the principal reason for
releasing an out-of-state seller's obligation to collect the use-tax); Jerome R. Hellerstein,
Significant Sales and Use Tax Developments During the Past Half Century, 39 VAND. L.
REV. 961, 985 (1986) (stating that the use-tax obligation on National Bellas Hess was not
authority for due process violations, but rather was an undue burden on interstate
commerce).
35. National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 757-58. See Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207(1960) (sustaining the application of Florida use-tax on a Georgia company which solicited
orders through Florida resident wholesalers); Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359(1941) (holding that the application of an Iowa use-tax on a New York mail-order company
that had retail outlets within Iowa was constitutional); Felt & Tarrant Mfr. Co. v. Gallagher,
306 U.S. 62 (1939) (sustaining the application of a California use-tax on an Illinois company
having general agents located in California which solicited orders). Compare Scripto, Inc.,
Sears, Roebuck & Co., and Felt & Tarrant Mfr. with Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S.
340 (1954) (holding that the Maryland use-tax statute was unconstitutional as applied to a
Delaware corporation which had no physical presence in Maryland).
36. National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758. This decision was made despite a strong
dissent from Justice Fortas, who would have found sufficient nexus between Illinois and
National Bellas Hess. National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 761-62 (Fortas, J., dissenting). Justice
Fortas based his analysis on the fact that Bellas Hess' activities were in the form of "large-
scale, systematic, continuous solicitation and exploitation of the Illinois consumer market
.... "" Id. at 761 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
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cally present within the state before a court had jurisdiction to
render a personal liability judgment.3 7 For nearly seventy years,
this physical presence3 requirement stood as the test for personal
jurisdiction.3 9 Then in 1945, because of changes in notice require-
ments that had developed over the years, 40 the court in Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington eliminated the physical presence
requirement and articulated a new "minimum contacts" test.4'
Under this test, the satisfaction of due process depends upon the
"quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and
orderly administration of the laws .... "42 The thrust of the "mini-
mum contacts" test is whether a corporation has sufficient contacts
with the state so that requiring the corporation to defend the par-
ticular suit in that state's court system is reasonable.43 When an
entity has "continuous and systematic activities" within a state
which give rise to the liability, that particular entity will be held to
be present in the state.44
This "minimum contacts" test liberalized the assertion of
37. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877) (holding that before personal liability can
be imposed on a defendant, the defendant must either be served within the state or
voluntarily appear).
38. Because the corporate personality is fictional, its presence within a state is
manifested only by activities carried on in the corporation's behalf by those who are
authorized to act for the corporation. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945). "Presenqe" is used to symbolize those activities of the corporation's agent
within the state which courts will deem to satisfy the demands of due process. Id. at 316-17.
39. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 355 (1927) (stating that there must be actual
service of process within the state in order to provide the court with jurisdiction over the
person); Chipman, Ltd. v. Jeffery Co., 251 U.S. 373, 376-80 (1920) (finding a lack ofjurisdiction over the defendant because the defendant was no longer present within the
state); Chase v. Wetzlar, 225 U.S. 79, 86 (1912) (stating that the essential element of
jurisdiction is the presence of the person or property within the state in which a court's
authority may be exerted); Cooper v. Newell, 173 U.S. 555, 567-68 (1899) (stating that
service of process within the state on a non-resident provides the court with jurisdiction
over the person, while constructive service does not provide a valid method of acquiring
such jurisdiction); Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U.S. 518, 521 (1895) (stating that a court of
justice cannot acquire jurisdiction over a non-resident who has not been served within the
state).
40. Personal service of a summons replaced the old capias ad respondendum method
of notifying a defendant of a suit. International Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316. Under the capias
ad respondendum method of notice, the defendant was arrested until security for the
plaintiff's claim was furnished. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 208 (6th ed. 1990).
41. International Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316. When an individual is not present in the
state of the presiding court, due process requires the existence of certain minimum contacts
with the state, so that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice." Id. (citations omitted).
42. Id. at 319.
43. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 203 (1977). Shaffer extended International Shoe's
"minimum contacts" test to in rem actions as well, holding "that all assertions of state-courtjurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe
and its progeny." Id. at 212.
44. International Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 317.
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jurisdiction by a state over nonresidents.45  The United States
Supreme Court has stated that when a commercial actor's activi-
ties are " 'purpose fuuy directed' toward residents of another State
... " mere absence of physical presence cannot defeat personal
jurisdiction.46 Thus, when an entity carries on such activities
within a state, that state's power to assert personal jurisdiction has
generally been sustained.47
C. ANALYSIS: EXTENSION OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
DUE PROCESS TO STATE TAXATION-PHYSICAL
PRESENCE No LONGER REQUIRED
The Quill Corp. majority, in its due process analysis, relied
heavily upon the evolution of personal jurisdiction to overrule the
National Bellas Hess physical presence requirement. 48 The Court
justified the application of its personal jurisdiction jurisprudence to
state taxation because of the continuous and systematic solicitation
efforts of mail-order companies.49 In light of these solicitation
efforts, the Court stated that mail-order companies should expect
that they may be subjected to a state's taxing jurisdiction, as well as
to a state's judicial jurisdiction.5 0 Consequently, the Quill Corp.
decision implies that the quantity of contacts necessary for judicial
and taxation jurisdiction are equivalent.5 '
The Court then proceeded to apply the new "minimum con-
nection" due process requirement for taxation purposes to the
facts of Quill Corp.52 The majority found that Quill Corp. "pur-
posefully directed its activities" at North Dakota residents through
45. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 610 n.1 (1975)
(Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
46. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (citations omitted).
47. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (holding that the
asserted jurisdiction by a California court against a Texas corporation which had no
connection with the state other than the insurance contract of the petitioner was in accord
with due process); Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 643-44 (1950) (finding
that an out-of-state entity's mail-order insurance transactions were enough to make the
entity subject to the state's jurisdiction). Compare International Life Ins. Co. and Travelers
Health Ass'n with World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (holding
that because of the lack of activity within the state, the entity was not subject to the state's
jurisdiction).
48. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1910-11 (1992).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1911 (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment)).
51. Id. The Court stated that through widespread solicitation efforts, due process
requirements can be met despite a corporation's lack of physical presence in the taxing
state. Id. The Supreme Court has also recognized that lack of physical presence does not
defeat personal jurisdiction when a commercial actor's activities were "'purposefully
directed' toward residents of another State . Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476
(citations omitted).
52. Quill Corp., 112 S. Ct. at 1911.
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its catalog solicitation efforts.5 3 The Court concluded that these
solicitation efforts provided more than sufficient nexus for due pro-
cess purposes.54 Therefore, the Due Process Clause was not a bar-
rier to the enforcement of North Dakota's use tax against Quill
Corp.55
IV. COMMERCE CLAUSE
A. COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALYSIS PRIOR TO NATIONAL
BELLAS HESS
The limitation on state taxation power imposed by the "nega-
tive or dormant" Commerce Clause has evolved significantly over
the years.56 Brown v. Maryland 7 provides the judicial origin for
the limitation on a state's taxation power based upon the negative
Commerce Clause. 58 The Brown Court, while concluding that
Maryland's stamp tax violated the Commerce Clause, also pro-
vided the first indication that interstate commerce would be free
of state taxation.59 Then, in 1888, the Supreme Court explicitly
held that interstate commerce was free from state taxation.6 °
53. Id. at 1911 (1992). See also Hartman, supra note 34, at 1011 ("Surely, an out-of-
state mail-order seller's 'commercial efforts are purposefully directed toward the residents
of another state.' ").
54. Quill Corp., 112 S. Ct. at 1911.
55. Id.
56. Id. One commentator has stated that "the Court has wound its way through a
labyrinth of shifting, tortuous judicial interpretations and approaches concerning the extent
to which the [C]ommerce [Cilause limits state taxation of interstate and foreign
commerce." HARTMAN, supra note 7, at 53.
The United States Constitution provides that Congress is to "regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The
Constitution has no provision for the protection of interstate commerce when there is no
congressional action. Quill Corp., 112 S. Ct. at 1911. However, when state regulations
provide an advantage to intrastate entities at the expense of interstate entities or place a
burden upon interstate entities, some argue that such regulations impinge upon the
Commerce Clause even though Congress has not acted. South Carolina Highway Dep't v.
Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 184-85 n.2 (1938). Thus, "by its own force," the
Commerce Clause "prohibits discrimination against interstate commerce, whatever [the]
form or method." Id. at 185.
57. 25 U.S. 419 (1827).
58. HARTMAN, supra note 7, at 54 (citing Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419 (1827)).
59. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419, 448 (1827). In his majority opinion, Justice
Marshall recognized that a state's power to tax its citizens was sacred, but that the power
must have some limits. Id. The limitations arise when taxation rises to the level of
regulating interstate commerce. Id. at 449. Justice Marshall relied on McCullough v.
Maryland, in which the Court held that the federal government was immune from state
taxation. Id. (citing McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819)). By relying on
McCullough, the Court implied that if the federal government is immune from state
taxation, so too is interstate commerce. Id. See HARTMAN, supra note 7, at 55 (stating that
"[the Court was] all but committed.., to the view that the [C]ommerce [C]lause prohibits
all state taxation of interstate commerce").
60. Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 648 (1888). The rationale for this limitation
was that taxation was considered a burden upon interstate commerce and was in essence a
regulation of it. Id. Such regulation of interstate commerce belongs solely to Congress by
452
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Nine years later, the Court narrowed this position by holding that
"interstate commerce... cannot be directly subjected to state tax-
ation," but incidental or indirect taxation was not an unconstitu-
tional burden on interstate commerce.6 In 1938, the Court
abandoned this direct-indirect distinction and focused on whether
interstate commerce could be subjected to concurrent taxation by
multiple taxing jurisdictions.62 Taxation by several taxing states
concerned the Court because such cumulative taxation would bur-
den and place barriers on interstate commerce and could ulti-
mately result in the destruction of interstate commerce.63
Eight years later, in Freeman v. Hewit,64 the Court reverted
back to the formalistic direct-indirect distinction.65 The rationale
for this reversion was that a direct tax upon interstate commerce
would deter trade because it was highly sensitive to any type of
burden.6 The Court found that a state's interest in revenue pro-
duction was outweighed by the burden a direct state tax would
impose upon interstate commerce.6 7 The Court rejected the mul-
tiple taxation doctrine because of the variation in state tax statutes
virtue of the Commerce Clause. Id.; U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. This taxation immunity
for interstate commerce was followed in subsequent cases. See Lyng v. Michigan, 135 U.S.
161, 166 (1890) ("No State has the right to lay a tax on interstate commerce in any form
.... "); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Alabama State Bd. of Assessment, 132 U.S. 472, 473 (1889)
(holding that entities engaged in activities that originate within the state and terminate in
points outside the state will not be taxed because of the interstate nature of the activity).
61. Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 165 U.S. 194, 220 (1897). A criticism of the direct-
indirect formalistic approach arose because the determination of the constitutionality of the
taxing statute was not based on any actual or probable hampering effect on interstate
commerce but was merely a result reached without providing the reasons for that result.
HARTMAN, supra note 7, at 63. See also Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927)
(Stone, J., dissenting) (stating that the words "direct" and "indirect interference" are
merely labels which "describe a result rather than any trustworthy formula by which it is
reached").
62. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1938) (citations
omitted). The fact that the business is interstate in nature did not relieve the entity from
state taxation simply because it added to the cost of doing business. Id. at 254.
63. Id. at 256. The Court stated that taxation by several states would adversely affect
interstate commerce because the cumulative taxes paid would place a heavy burden on
interstate commerce. Id. However, local commerce would be free of such burdens. Id.
The Court reasoned that the destruction of interstate commerce would result because local
commerce enjoyed the freedom from the cumulative burdens imposed upon interstate
commerce. Id. Therefore, the advantage given to local commerce would discourage the
development of interstate commerce.
64. 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
65. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 256-57 (1946).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 253. The state interest in targeting interstate commerce as a source of
income arises because of the benefits and protections that government provides interstate
commerce, such as a market, police protection, and a state court system. Id. Therefore,
local government aspires to make interstate commerce pay a fair share of the costs incurred
by government to furnish these benefits and protections. Id. However, the Court stated
that denying this revenue source would not impose a crippling effect on local government's
ability to carry on its functions. Id.
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that occur over time.68 As the Freeman Court noted, a statute may
be constitutional at one moment, when no other state would tax
the transaction, yet unconstitutional a moment later, when
another state statute comes into existence subjecting the transac-
tion to taxation by two states.69
This formalistic approach was reaffirmed by the Court in
Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor.0 In Spector Motor Ser-
vice, the Court invalidated a Connecticut tax imposed for the priv-
ilege of carrying on business in the state."' Spector Motor Service,
an exclusively interstate entity authorized to perform part of its
trucking through Connecticut, was required to pay this tax.72 The
Court found that the power to directly tax interstate commerce
was delegated solely to Congress through the Commerce Clause.73
Thus, without authorization from Congress, a state lacks the power
to directly tax interstate commerce. 4
B. NATIONAL BELLAS HESS7 5
In National Bellas Hess, the Court held that Illinois' use-tax
placed an undue burden on National Bellas Hess, an entity
involved in interstate commerce. 6 The Court based its decision
on the following analysis:
Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of commercial transac-
tions more exclusively interstate in character than the
mail order transactions here involved. And if the power
of Illinois to impose use tax burdens upon National [Bellas
Hess] were upheld, the resulting impediments upon the
free conduct of its interstate business would be neither
imaginary nor remote. For if Illinois can impose such
burdens, so can every other State, and so, indeed, can
every municipality, every school district, and every other
political subdivision throughout the Nation with power to
impose sales and use taxes. The many variations in rates
of tax, in allowable exemptions, and in administrative and
68. Id. at 256 ("The immunities implicit in the Commerce Clause and the potential
taxing power of a State can hardly be made to depend, in the world of practical affairs, on
the shifting incidence of the varying tax laws of the various States at a particular moment.").
69. Id.
70. 340 U.S. 602, 607-10 (1951).
71. Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 603 n.1 (1951).
72. Id. at 606.
73. Id. at 608; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
74. Id.
75. National Bellas Hess serves as the precedent for Quill Corp. See supra note 33
(providing factual similarities between National Bellas Hess and Quill Corp.).
76. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 759-60 (1967).
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record-keeping requirements could entangle National's
interstate business in a virtual welter of complicated obli-
gations to local jurisdictions with no legitimate claim to
impose "a fair share of the cost of local government. 77
The Court stated that the purpose of the Commerce Clause is to
protect the national economy from "unjustifiable local entangle-
ments" such as those imposed by Illinois.78 Such regulation and
control of interstate commerce is within the sole domain of Con-
gress, and not Illinois or any other state.79
C. COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALYSIS SUBSEQUENT TO
NATIONAL BELLAS HESS
In 1977, the Supreme Court decided the case of Complete
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady.0 This decision specifically overruled
Spector Motor Service, which was a case decided prior to National
Bellas Hess.81 The Complete Auto Transit Court recognized that
the holding in Spector Motor Service, that a direct tax on interstate
commerce violated the Constitution, was only a "rule of drafts-
manship.18 2 The "direct tax rule" of Spector Motor Service did not
provide for an inquiry into the practical effects of the tax.8"
The Court also rejected the philosophy underlying Spector
Motor Service, namely, that interstate commerce was free from
state taxation.8 4 The Complete Auto Transit Court outlined a four-
part test to decide whether a state tax statute should be sustained
under a Commerce Clause attack:
1. whether the tax is applied to an activity with a sub-
stantial nexus with the taxing State;
2. whether the tax is fairly apportioned;
77. Id. (footnotes omitted).
78. Id. at 760.
79. Id.
80. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
81. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430'U.S. 274, 288-89 (1977). The Freeman
decision was implicitly overruled because Spector Motor Service was considered a progeny
of Freeman. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1912 (1992). See supra notes 64-
74 and accompanying text (discussing the Freeman decision and its reaffirmation by Spector
Motor Service).
82. Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 285. See also Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle,
421 U.S. 100, 115 (1975) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that the distinction between an
invalid statute that taxes the privilege of doing business in the state and a valid statute that
taxes the qualification of doing business in the state had little substantive difference and
merely amounted to taxation by semantics); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 358
U.S. 434, 441 (1959) (providing that the use of certain words in the taxing statute could
result in the statute's validation).
83. Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 285.
84. Id. at 288 (finding that interstate commerce's tax-free status had "been stripped of
any practical significance").
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3. whether the tax discriminates against interstate com-
merce; and
4. whether the tax is fairly related to the services pro-
vided by the State.8 5
Thus, the Court became more concerned with the practical effect
of the tax statute, rather than with any type of formalistic distinc-
tion.8 The North Dakota Supreme Court suggested that the Com-
plete Auto Transit decision rendered National Bellas Hess
obsolete.8 7 The court stated that there had been changes in the
legal landscape since the National Bellas Hess decision,38 These
changes included the United States Supreme Court decisions
which expanded states' authority to tax interstate commerce and
broadened the Due Process and Commerce Clauses in non-tax
areas.89 The North Dakota Supreme Court cited Complete Auto
Transit as the most striking example of the shift in the United
States Supreme Court's position on taxation of interstate com-
merce.9 ° Therefore, based on the apparent shift in the legal land-
scape, particularly the Complete Auto Transit decision, as well as
social and economic changes in the United States, the North
Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the National Bellas Hess
standard was obsolete. 9'
D. ANALYSIS
1. Vitality of National Bellas Hess' Commerce Clause
Decision
Despite the North Dakota Supreme Court's suggestion to the
contrary, the Quill Corp. majority found that the Complete Auto
Transit decision did not render National Bellas Hess obsolete.92
The majority stated that Complete Auto Transit had rejected only
the formalistic distinction between the direct and indirect taxation
which was present in Spector Motor Service.9" As a result, the con-
stitutionality of state taxing statutes no longer turned on the verbal
characterization of the levy being a direct or indirect burden on
85. Id. at 279.
86. Id.
87. North Dakota v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 207-15 (1991), rev'd 112 S. Ct. 1904
(1992).
88. Id. at 209.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 207-15.
92. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1912 (1992).
93. Id.
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interstate commerce.94 The Quill Corp. majority stated that the
National Bellas Hess decision did not rely on such labeling.95
Rather, National Bellas Hess "stands for the proposition that a
vendor whose only contacts with the taxing state are by mail or
common carrier lacks the 'substantial nexus' required by the Com-
merce Clause."'9 6  The Court found that National Bellas Hess
involved a substantial nexus analysis, which is the first of the four
tests outlined in Complete Auto Transit.97 Therefore, the Court
reasoned that National Bellas Hess was consistent with Complete
Auto Transit.98
As correctly pointed out by Justice White in his dissenting
opinion, the National Bellas Hess Court gave substantial weight to
the exclusively interstate character of mail-order sales.9 9 The
Court in Spector Motor Service also relied heavily upon the fact
that the activity to be taxed was exclusively interstate. 0 0 The
Court's reliance on the exclusively interstate character of the
taxed entities demonstrates that National Bellas Hess invalidated
the application of Illinois' tax for the same reason found in Spector
Motor Service.'' The tax was a direct burden on interstate com-
merce. 10 2 It appears that the underlying rationale of National Bel-
las Hess was the same as Spector Motor Service: Interstate
commerce is free from state taxation.' 0 3 Complete Auto Transit
rejected this proposition.1 4 Logically, it follows that Complete
Auto Transit rendered National Bellas Hess obsolete.' 0 5
In order to supplement its proposition, the Quill Corp. major-
ity relied upon cases decided subsequent to Complete Auto Transit
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Quill Corp., 112 S. Ct. at 1912. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (listing
Complete Auto Transit's four-part test for a Commerce Clause attack).
98. Quill Corp., 112 S. Ct. at 1912.
99. Id. at 1917 (White, J., dissenting) (citing National Bellas Hess Inc. v. Department of
Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 759 (1967)).
100. Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 608 (1951).
101. Quill Corp., 112 S. Ct. at 1917 (White, J., dissenting) (stating that National Bellas
Hess is indistinguishable from Spector Motor Service).
102. Spector Motor Serv., Inc., 340 U.S. at 608-10.
103. Quill Corp., 112 S. Ct. at 1917 (White, J., dissenting). See also Spector Motor Serv.,
340 U.S. at 608-10.
104. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 288-89 (1977). See also
Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 259 (1989) (noting that "Complete Auto ... specifically
reject[ed] the view that the States cannot tax interstate commerce"); D.H. Holmes Co., Ltd.
v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 30 (1988) (providing that "Complete Auto abandoned the
abstract notion that interstate commerce 'itself' cannot be taxed by the States").
105. Quill Corp., 112 S. Ct. at 1917 (White, J., dissenting) ("What [was] disavowed in
Complete Auto was not just the 'formal distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect' taxes on
'interstate commerce' but also the whole notion that 'interstate commerce is immune
from state taxation.' ").
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which had cited National Bellas Hess favorably.' In particular,
the Court relied upon National Geographic Society v. California
Board of Equalization.1 7 In that case, National Bellas Hess was
cited for its sharp distinction between mail-order sellers having a
physical presence in the taxing state and those having contact
merely by mail or common carrier.108 The National Geographic
Society was classified as a mail-order seller having a physical pres-
ence within the taxing state, unlike National Bellas Hess, which
had no such presence.' 9 The National Geographic Society Court
found that "the relevant constitutional test to establish the requi-
site nexus... [is] simply whether the facts demonstrate 'some defi-
nite link, some minimum connection between [the State and] the
person ... it seeks to tax.' ,,n In light of this language, it appears
clear that National Geographic Society, although decided under
the auspices of the Commerce Clause, used a Due Process Clause
nexus analysis."' Therefore, citing National Geographic Society
as support for the vitality of National Bellas Hess' Commerce
Clause decision appears to be inappropriate.
2. Commerce Clause Nexus Requirement
The Quill Corp. majority refused to accept the State's argu-
ment that the nexus requirements of the Due Process Clause and
the Commerce Clause were equivalent." 2 This refusal was based
on the differing concerns and policies that the two Clauses emu-
106. Id. at 1912.
107. 430 U.S. 551 (1977).
108. National Geographic Soc'y v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 559
(1977).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 561 (citing Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954)). See
supra notes 30-55 and accompanying text (discussing the due process issue).
111. Hartman, supra note 34, at 1000 (noting that "the Court [in National Geographic]
applied the concept of nexus for due process purposes").
The Quill Corp. majority noted other cases subsequent to National Geographic Society
which also cited National Bellas Hess favorably. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct.
1904, 1912-13 (1992) (citing Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252 (1989); D.H. Holmes Co., Ltd.
v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24 (1988); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609
(1981); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980)). Two of these cases
cited National Bellas Hess under the guise of the Due Process Clause: D.H. Holmes Co.,
486 U.S. at 33 (stating that the taxpayer's activities, having little similarity with the mail-
order activities in National Bellas Hess, were closely related to those engaged in by the
National Geographic Society, and therefore National Geographic Society's due process
based decision controlled); Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 436-37 and 442-49 (citing National Bellas
Hess when eliciting the due process requirements, yet conspicuously excluding National
Bellas Hess in its Commerce Clause analysis). These cases cited by the Quill Corp. majority
"hardly signal the continuing support of Bellas Hess." Quill Corp., 112 S. Ct. at 1918 n.2
(White, J., dissenting).
112. Quill Corp., 112 S. Ct. at 1913.
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late."t3 The Court carefully distinguished the Clauses to highlight
the differing concerns. 114 As previously noted in this Comment," 5
the Due Process Clause addresses the fundamental fairness of gov-
ernmental activity upon the individual.1 6 However, the Com-
merce Clause is concerned with the effects of state regulation on
the national economy." 7 According to the Quill Corp. Court,
Complete Auto Transit's "substantial nexus" test reflects the Com-
merce Clause concerns."' Complete Auto Transit reflects these
concerns because the "substantial nexus" test limits the extent of a
state's taxing ability, safeguarding against undue burdens on inter-
state commerce."19 In contrast, the majority stated that the due
process "minimum contacts" test was merely "a proxy for
notice.' 20 Based on this rather shallow reasoning, the Court con-
cluded that the Due Process Clause and Commerce Clause nexus
requirements were not the same, because a corporation may have
the "minimum contacts" to satisfy the Due Process Clause yet lack
the "substantial nexus" for the Commerce Clause.' 2 '
The majority cited Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washing-
ton 22 as a case in which the due process nexus requirement was
met, yet the Commerce Clause substantial nexus requirement was
not satisfied.' 2 3 However, the Court in Tyler Pipe Industries found
that the tax statute violated the Commerce Clause because it dis-
criminated against interstate commerce, but it did not address the
Commerce Clause nexus issue. 124 The Washington manufacturers
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
116. Quill Corp. 112 S. Ct. at 1913 (emphasis added).
117. Id. (emphasis added). The Court noted that North Dakota's use-tax statute would
be an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce because of the ease with which out-
of-state sellers could be subjected to the collection duty. Under North Dakota's statute, the
collection duty is imposed on every vendor that advertises three times in a year through the
vendor's use of subscription cards in magazines, radio advertisements heard in North
Dakota, or phone calls by salespeople made to North Dakota customers. Id. Thus, the
nation's 6,000-plus taxing jurisdictions could do the same. Id. at 1913 n.6.
118. Id. at 1913.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Quill Corp., 112 S. Ct. at 1913-14.
122. 483 U.S. 232 (1987).
123. Quill Corp., 112 S. Ct. at 1914 n.7.
124. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington, 483 U.S. 232, 248 (1987). Tyler Pipe
Industries involved two appeals. Id. at 240. The second appeal, addressing the Due Process
Clause, was based upon the argument that Tyler Pipe Industries' activities in Washington
were not sufficient to subject it to Washington's taxing jurisdiction. Id. Tyler Pipe
Industries had no offices, employees, or property within Washington. Id. at 249. However,
an "independent contractor" located in Seattle solicited business for Tyler Pipe Industries.
Id. The Court stated that merely classifying the salesman as an independent contractor
could not defeat a finding that there was sufficient nexus with the taxing state. Id. at 250
(citing Scripto Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960) and National Geographic Soc'y v.
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appealed under the Commerce Clause because the Washington
manufacturing tax was levied only upon goods produced within
the state and sold elsewhere.' 2 5 The Washington manufacturers
who sold their products within the state were exempted from this
tax. 12  The Court held that this violated the Commerce Clause
because it "unfairly burden[ed] commerce by exacting more than
a just share from the interstate activity."'2 7 The Tyler Pipe Indus-
tries Court did not discuss the Commerce Clause substantial nexus
issue. 1 2  It appears that the nexus requirement was a non-issue in
Tyler Pipe Industries because the manufacturers were located
within the taxing state.'2 9 Contrary to what the Quill Corp. major-
ity states, Tyler Pipe Industries does not demonstrate a situation in
which the Due Process nexus requirement was met, yet the Com-
merce Clause nexus requirement was not satisfied. The Com-
merce Clause violation was not a result of a lack of nexus, but
rather, resulted because interstate commerce entities were paying
more than their fair share of the tax burden.13 0 Therefore, the
Quill Corp. majority's position that the Commerce Clause and the
Due Process Clause have separate nexus requirements appears to
be "without precedent or explanation. ''
3. Physical Presence: A Bright-line Rule
The Quill Corp. Court held that requiring a physical presence
in the taxing state furthered the ends of the Commerce Clause by
avoiding undue burdens on interstate commerce. 132 The majority
reasoned that such a bright-line rule would end the confusion and
litigation regarding a state's taxing powers caused by prior deci-
sions under the Commerce Clause. 133 The majority recognized
that this rule can sometimes lead to artificial results.13 4  Such
results occur when an entity that has a small sales staff or office in
California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977)). Because the independent contractor
"established and maintained a market" in Washington, there was sufficient nexus to support
Washington's taxing jurisdiction over Tyler Pipe Industries. Id. at 250-51.
125. Id. at 240.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 247. This is the third of the four-part test that Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady articulated for a state tax statute Commerce Clause analysis. Complete Auto Transit,
Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). See supra note 85 and accompanying text (providing
Complete Auto Transit's four-part test).
128. Tyler Pipe Indus., 483 U.S. at 239.
129. See Id. at 240.
130. Id. at 247.
131. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1920 (1992) (White, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 1914.
133. Id. at 1915.
134. Id. at 1914.
460 [Vol. 69:445
CASE COMMENT
the taxing state would meet the physical presence requirement,
but a large company soliciting business in the state with no such
physical contact would not meet this requirement.135 Although
the physical presence rule appears artificial in these instances, 136
the majority found that the benefits of such a clear rule outweigh
this artificiality. 137 The benefits of the rule include a firm under-
standing by the states of the extent of their taxing ability, which
promotes "settled expectations" on the status of the law. 138 These
benefits encourage business investment. 139 The Court also found
that adhering to this bright-line rule promoted "stability and
orderly development of the law. " 14
Prior to deciding Quill Corp., the United States Supreme
Court held that an entity's "slightest [physical] presence" is not
sufficient to meet the Commerce Clause's physical presence
requirement. 14  Litigation on the factual determination of the
"slightest presence" threshold appears to be forthcoming,1 42 par-
ticularly when states face a loss of approximately $3,270,000,000 in
uncollected use-taxes in 1992 alone. 143 The ambiguity regarding
what will exceed "slightest presence" undercuts the Court's "sta-
bility and orderly development of the law" argument.
The bright-line rule requiring physical presence within the
taxing state to satisfy the requirements of the Commerce Clause is
alive and well.' 44 Because Quill Corp. lacked physical presence in
North Dakota, as required by the rule in National Bellas Hess,
North Dakota's use-tax statute was held to be an unconstitutional
burden on interstate commerce when applied to Quill Corp. 41
135. See Id.
136. See Quill Corp., 112 S. Ct. at 1914.
137. Quill Corp., 112 S. Ct. at 1915.
138. Id.
139. Id. There was at least a partial connection to the huge growth in the mail-order
business because of the bright-line state taxation exemption that National Bellas Hess
created. Id.
140. Id. (quoting Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 190-91 (1976)). But see Arkansas
Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 391-92 (1983) (holding that
the precedent-setting decision had become anachronistic, was not relied on by the Court
for many years in its Commerce Clause decisions, and no one had developed any reliance
interests with regard to that decision).
141. Quill Corp., 112 S. Ct. at 1914 n.8 (quoting National Geographic Soc'y v.
California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 556 (1977)). The Quill Corp. majority stated
that the computer software disks which were given to North Dakota customers were
examples of insufficient "slightest presence" in a taxing state. Id.
142. Id. at 1921 (White, J. dissenting) (stating that "[r]easonable minds surely can, and
will, differ over what is required to make out a "physical presence' ").
143. Brief for Respondent at 9, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992) (No.
91-194).
144. Quill Corp., 112 S. Ct. at 1916.
145. On remand, the North Dakota Supreme Court vacated its judgment regarding
the Commerce Clause, which had been reversed by the United States Supreme Court's
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Consequently, the state lacks the power to require Quill Corp. or
other sellers similarly situated to collect and remit use-taxes.
V. IMPACT
Out-of-state mail-order companies, such as Quill Corp., con-
tinue to enjoy exemption from state use-tax collection duties as
long as they do not have a physical presence in the taxing state. 146
However, this status may not last long, because the Supreme
Court, stating that Congress may be better qualified to resolve the
underlying issue, opened the door for Congress to exercise its
Commerce Clause powers to eliminate the only remaining obsta-
cle for states in this taxation area. 147 Congressional action allowing
states to impose use-tax collection on out-of-state entities seems
more likely than before National Bellas Hess'14  because of the
economic problems of state governments, the slashing of federal
aid to states, 49 and the extensive use of computer software for
automated accounting systems.' 50 This appeal for congressional
action undercuts the Quill Corp. majority's rationale of adhering
to the physical presence rule for stability and reliance purposes,' 5'
because the fight now moves to the halls of Congress. Suspecting
that some type of congressional action on this issue is forthcoming
hardly leaves the out-of-state retailer or the states with "settled
expectations" of the law.' 5
2
The other alternative for states, besides obtaining congres-
sional approval of use-tax collection, is to collect the tax from the
individuals who purchase goods from out-of-state companies.' 53
However, the viability of such an approach is suspect. This
approach would not be cost efficient, as these purchases generally
are small dollar items, providing minimal tax revenue on a per
decision, and affirmed the trial court's decision that found N.D. Cent. Code section 57-40.2-
01(6)-(7) unconstitutional as applied to Quill Corp. North Dakota v. Quill Corp., 487
N.W.2d 598, 598-99 (N.D. 1992). Later, Quill Corp. petitioned for a rehearing, asserting
that it was entitled to attorney fees. North Dakota v. Quill Corp., 1993 WL 150414 (N.D.
May 11, 1993). The North Dakota Supreme Court denied this request. Id. at *8.
146. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1916 (1992).
147. Id.
148. The Due Process Clause was an obstacle prior to Quill Corp. because Congress
does not have the power to authorize violations of the Due Process Clause. Quill Corp., 112
S. Ct. at 1909.
149. Hartman, supra note 34, at 1013.
150. Id. at 1011 (relying on a letter by John R. Gregory, former head of the Tennessee
Sales and Use Tax Division, regarding automated accounting systems).
151. Quill Corp., 112 S. Ct. at 1915-16.
152. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1915 (1992).
153. Hartman, supra note 7, at 57-58 (stating that the resident user or consumer
generally is imposed with the legal incidence of the use-tax).
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item basis. Also, the availability of state resources for such an
approach would be limited as states face revenue shortfalls.
Finding that collecting directly from individuals will not be
viable, the states will look solely to Congress for help to alleviate
this problem. The pressure on Congress to act should be high
because the states view this as an opportunity to generate revenue
during times of revenue shortfalls. However, the mail-order
industry will also be applying its own pressure to keep its current
status intact. This should be an interesting battle, and one in
which speculating on the winner is "taxing."
Daniel L. Gaustad

